News Letter 3: CTF


When considered in the context of computer security, Capture the Flag (CTF) involves taking control of and or defending digital "flags" in some way. Many parallels can be drawn with the well-known physical game of CTF played by teams of people where each team typically defends one flag while also attempting to capture the flag of another team.

Computer and network security oriented CTFs have grown quite popular in the past few years. Some teams are now well-known and compete in many events throughout the year. In some cases a CTF might award considerable prizes to top-placing teams, and in other cases teams compete solely for prestige or educational experience. In fact, similar to sporting events, larger CTFs will hold preceding qualification rounds in order to determine eligibility for the later CTF. In some cases, brackets are formed or winners of peer events are automatically deemed eligible based on prior performance.

Given that such CTF events are now a regular occurrence and team knowledge persists between events, a newcomer to the field may be at a significant disadvantage. The disadvantage is not necessarily related to the technical prowess fielded by the team, but in a lack of historical knowledge regarding gameplay and even culture surrounding security-oriented CTFs. The intention of this article is to lessen this disadvantage by relating historical gameplay knowledge that may well be taken for granted by seasoned CTF participants.


Many CTF events, sometimes called exercises, recur annually and some enjoy a longevity of more than a decade. For example, the CTF associated with the annual hacker conference DEFCON has existed in some form since 1996, becoming more formally organized in 1999. An event organized by the University of California - Santa Barbara has been held annually since 2003. An event may impose certain restrictions based on desired learning objectives, political pressure, availability of prizes to award or any number of such influences. Some events limit team size, or limit the composition to only academic affiliates, professionals, or a certain level of education. As such, the organization and composition of each event also vary widely with some events lasting only a few hours while others last months. Some stress defense, others focus on offense. Some strive to represent "real world" security issues that may be encountered by programmers or security practitioners. Some strive to test esoteric or depths of knowledge encountered by few. In any case, the quintessential property of a computer security CTF is that a participant will circumvent a security property in some way, and receives some form of credit for doing so.

Digital Flags

Flags, often called "keys," in these events typically consist of a relatively small set of sequential bytes. A flag might be a short string of recognizable words, a set of random printable characters, a cryptographic hash, or indeed it may be nearly anything representable by computer memory. Flags are often on the order of dozens of bytes in length. Flags are frequently stored in files and secured using various access control facilities provided by the host operating system.

Once a security property is circumvented, a player often must retrieve or provide a flag in order to demonstrate the circumvention. A CTF event may even differentiate between types of flags. In an attack that results in increased information disclosure, an attacker may gain the ability to read otherwise restricted memory. In this case a flag has been "stolen." These flags might be known as "read flags." In a complementary way, a "write flag" or "overwrite flag" may be used to demonstrate an ability to alter otherwise restricted memory.

The primary objective is to circumvent a security property, so following a successful attack, locating the flag is often not difficult. A participant may even know the location far in advance of the attack, but not be able to access the flag data until mounting a successful attack. For example, a flag might simply exist as a file named "key" or "flag" in a unix account home directory. This name and location path of this file might be easily enumerable by another other account, but due to file permissions, the contents of the file might not be readily observed. Similar easy-to-locate yet difficult-to-leverage parallels exist for flag content stored in other ways (e.g. database, in Random Access Memory, etc.).

Game Type

Most CTFs can be categorized into two styles of game play: attack-defend and board-style.

Attack-defend involves actually attacking flags held by another team in some way, and mitigating attacks mounted by other teams. In this type of event, teams are often connected via a network and the network locations of each team are known or readily discoverable. Attack-defend events are often held "on-site" on an isolated network with all participants physically present. Often such events are co-located with a conference. In some cases, attack-defend events are held in a geographically disparate way. However, even geographically distributed events tend to adopt an isolated networking model using VPNs and restricted routing. Teams operate and defend several discrete, vulnerable services on live computer systems. A service is a network accessible piece of software that often implements a communication protocol developed specifically for the CTF and which contains intentionally injected vulnerabilities intended to be discovered and exploited by participating teams. Real world examples of services include web, email, telnet, and ftp servers. Defenses may involve installing network security devices, configuring software controls on the machine hosting a service, locating and patching a vulnerability in a service, and so on.

The other popular style of play is board-style, often called a "Jeopardy Board" style game - regardless of the visual similarity to the popular television game show. Think of each square of a two-dimensional grid representing a single discrete problem that has an associated credit awarded for completion. Instead of services, these discrete problems are typically referred to as challenges or puzzles. In the same way, flags might be referred to as solutions or answers. Teams strive to complete more of the board than any other team. In this style of play, teams often have no defensive responsibility at all. A challenge might be exactly the same as an attack-defend service, however the service is hosted by the organizer and not other participants. Board-style events also lend to challenges that do not fit network-based or attack-defend paradigms. For example, challenges based on Digital Forensics might adopt a form factor more as a complex file system rather than the single executable form factor adopted for attack-defend services. Similarly, such a Digital Forensics oriented challenge would not be interactive in any way, obviating several participant strategies and scoring mechanism described later.

Both types of events typically have one or more time components, the most obvious of which is the duration of the event. That is, when the event begins, teams often all share the same score, and at the end of the event, the team with the best score is declared the victor.

There are, of course, many variations on these two types of play. For instance, a "Defense only" event might be held, such as those organized for the U.S. Service Academies or the Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition. These are effectively attack-defend events, only the event organizer assumes all the attack components and forbids participants to attack via event rules.

Modifications also exist to the board-style event, typically involving some ostensibly clever modification to the board itself. For example, a CTF might force completion of puzzles in a certain progression, have all participants vote on the "next" puzzle, or have the puzzle selected by the most recent participant to provide a correct answer to the current question . In the end, most events still reduce to the common thread of having sets of problems, and the team that possesses the most, or more valuable, solutions to these problems is in the favorable position.

Service Availability

Particular to attack-defend events, Service Level Availability (SLA) refers to the notion that each team should actually present opportunities for other teams to attack. Factoring SLA into a scoring algorithm is beneficial for gameplay and to encourage defensive tactics. The intent of SLA is to prevent participants from creating a perfect defense by simply shutting down their services to eliminate any attack surface. If every team did this however, there would be no game to play. Akin to the real-world task of securing Internet-facing services, such a service is relatively safe when it is unavailable, but it provides little utility.

Measuring the "availability" of a service is an interesting proposition. In the instance of a TCP-based service, the SLA measurement system should not simply check for a successful connect on the service TCP port. In this case, a perfect defense for a participant would be to disable the service entirely and then write software to accept connections on the same port, yet not actually do anything else with the TCP connection. In this way, the SLA measurement system would always measure the service as available. Instead, measurements must actually interact with a service.

Unfortunately, interactions with services tend to vary widely, so measuring SLA becomes somewhat complex. Further, each service has known vulnerabilities, which a participant is permitted to patch or otherwise mitigate, thereby changing at least some of the possible interactivity with the service (ideally, permitting all relevant interactions, but precisely disallowing interactions that lead to a vulnerability). Therefore, the SLA measurement system must interact with each service in a manner specific to that service. Furthermore, these interactions must exercise all relevant functionality that a service implements. These interactions are sometimes called "polls" and likewise, the action of measuring SLA over time is called "polling." Polls are typically measured one or more times per scoring round. In most cases polls do not exercise the vulnerabilities planted within the services as observation of such interactions would aid teams in locating the vulnerabilities.


A service in an attack-defend event is typically scored over time. That is, in contrast to a board- style event, a flag can be defended and stolen and/or overwritten more than once. The most common way to implement this is via the notion of scoring rounds. A scoring round is the duration of time in which a scoring event might occur. For instance, if a scoring round is arbitrarily set to 5 minutes by the organizers, then a team that steals a flag from another team multiple times in a given 5 minute window will only receive credit for one stolen flag within this particular window of time. However, the next 5-minute interval represents a new round, in which the team may again receive credit as long as they are again able to mount a successful attack. Logistically, the organizers somehow change or "rotate" all the flags in the environment, such that the same flag location will contain new data to be stolen in each round. The requirement to steal new flags in each new round forces teams to demonstrate persistent access into their adversary's services.

The actual scoring algorithms vary with each CTF, but in addition to offensive and defensive components, they typically include an aformentioned availability component, sometimes called Service Level Availability (SLA). SLA is meant to ensure that teams are providing services to the event, as opposed to disabling services entirely.

For each round, a team may achieve a perfect defensive score be ensuring none of their flags are stolen or overwritten. Similarly, a perfect offensive score might be achieved by stealing flags for all services from all other teams. A perfect SLA would be achieved by having all of team's services available and responding correctly as measured by some number of service polls. CTFs might employ scoring algorithms that favor one aspect or another and might introduce dependancies. For example, a CTF might not award any offense point unless a certain threshold of SLA is maintianed.

Pre-determined bonus values might also be awarded in an attack-defend event, colloquially known as "breakthroughs." These breakthroughs are used to artificially boost a team's score as a reward for being the first to demonstrate circumvention of a security property on a service. Details vary by implementation, but scoring in attack-defend events is typically handled out-of-band using a dedicated interface for teams to present stolen flags.

In a board-style event, the value of solving a particular problem is typically entirely pre-determined by the organizers. Often, a flag is procured by the team after solving a problem and the flag is presented to the organizers by the team as proof that a problem has been solved. This presentation, like attack-defend styles, is typically performed in a way that is out-of-band from the problem.


Some implementation-specific concepts have already been mentioned, such as the notion of a 5-minute scoring round. However, implementing a CTF is a complex endeavor and as such numerous implementation details can be varied to distinguish one CTF from another. In addition to defining the nature or spirit of the CTF, implementation details might also vary simply to encourage particular learning objectives or discourage particular participant strategies.

Consider the participant's interfaces to the CTF infrastructure. Fundamentally all a participant requires is the ability to interact with other teams' services. However, it is very common to also provide a technological mechanism for presenting stolen flags as proof that a security property was violated and some form of scoreboard to denote progress through the event and/or relative ranking among other competitors. The notion of a scoreboard is interesting in relation to participant strategy. If the scoreboard interface is tailored to each team, then colluding teams may maintain an advantage. If the scoreboard presents not only ordering of participants, but also scaled performance such that one team knows by how much it is losing, the team might be able to calculate a likelihood of making up the difference in the remaining time. If this likelihood is low, the losing participant may well prematurely exit competition. Such is also likely to occur if a scoreboard is available to non-participants, so that outsiders can observe the state of the CTF.

The notion of outsider, or spectator, involvement is often at odds with goals of the CTF organizer. In addition to the mentioned complexities relating to a public scoreboard, consider other obvious candidates for spectator involvement. Real-time indications of attack outcome effectively acts as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for participants, prompting defenders to focus on related aspects of the CTF. Even seemingly innocuous visualizations intended to inform spectators may divulge information to participants. When such visualizations are intended for spectators, but used by participants, some consideration to fairness must be made by the organizers. For instance, ensuring that all teams have an equal ability to actually see the visualization.

Numerous other implementation decisions that may be made to govern the structure of a CTF. In attack-defend scenarios, the participant may be able to physically disconnect the server they are defending. In this case, "in-line" defenses, such as a Network IDS appliance might be employed to protect the server. In other cases a participant might instead connect to a physically remote server, eliminating the possibility of using an "in-line" appliance. In the same vein, decisions must be made about "in-network" vs "out-of-network" key rotation. That is, will key rotation performed by the organizers occur though the CTF network, or will keys be rotated independent of the network; via a virtualization hypervisor, for instance. Some of these decisions are behind-the-scenes and participants may never know the decision made or the reasoning behind it; other decisions have profound impact on the particpant's interaction with the CTF. In the end, each CTF event is uniquely defined in this manner.

Participant Strategies

Teams might develop broad strategies over time through the course of participating in several events. Other strategies might be conceived during an event or otherwise be event-specific. To develop effective event-specific strategies, a team must fully understand the scoring algorithm. For example, some scoring systems facilitate building insurmountable leads, while other systems encourage diversity in scoring or facilitate inspiring come-from-behind scoring drives. Strategies offered in this section typically only apply to attack-defend CTFs.

Consider a commodity-based scoring system. In such a system, a flag scored by a team on a often-scored-upon service is worth very little, where a flag scored by a team on a rarely-scored-upon service is valued much higher. This is the same principle, rarity, that makes diamonds more valuable than rocks. By scoring in this way, the service difficulty is determined by the participants themselves. Easier services are generally scored on more often, by more participants. More difficult services are scored on rarely by relatively few participants. A participant in a commodity-based scoring CTF must consider different strategies of play. For instance, if a participant believes that the likelihood of another participant scoring on a service under their own accord is low, then the participant might wait until the final minutes of the CTF to score a single, very valuable, flag from a service. Similarly, a participant might focus efforts on attacking one or two weak teams, because the weak team might not be able to learn anything from the attacks making the attack a low-risk proposition. Or a team might delay attacking a particular service in order to develop a more stealthy attack, making the attack more difficult to observe or repurpose.

While the effects may be more pronounced under commodity-based scoring, attacking weaker participants or enhancing attacks to be more stealthy, resistant to reverse engineering, or otherwise more difficult to repurpose are all commonly employed strategies.

In attack-defend CTFs, participants are often connected to one another via standard networking, TCP/IP and Ethernet for instance. The shared resource of the network is typically managed by the CTF organizer. From a participant's perspective, the network is the only interface from which benign interactions with a service will occur (either from another participant or from the organizer as a component of scoring). If a participant is able to distinguish between scoring and participant-originated traffic, then action can be taken to ensure scoring traffic is untouched while participant traffic is abandoned or modified - thus creating a perfect defense for the CTF. Similar "fingerprinting" might be done to detect traffic from individual competitors (e.g. those using a different operating system than others, emitting TCP/IP stack artifacts unique to the CTF).

The network can also be used to identify attacks in order to inform defensive tactics or to repurpose attacks. Network traffic might be correlated to a particular service (e.g. TCP port) and subsequently some artifact of a successful attack (e.g. bash shell). In any case, if a portion of network traffic is identified as an attack, then the "victim" participant in this case, may focus effort on adapting the captured traffic in order to attack a different participant. The cleanest example would be an attack where simply changing the source and destination IPs would launch an attack to a new participant. While this strategy can be very effective, this is often, but not always, a "keeping up" strategy. That is, if this is a participant's primary strategy, then that participant will never be the first to score points on any service. However, if a team launches an attack against a service that the same team has not yet patched, then they remain vulnerable to their own attack. If a team that is good at repurposing is also better at automating attacks against all teams, then they may quickly surpass the original author by effectively making better use of the attack. In multi-team attack-defend CTFs, scoring scenarios can occur where many teams each have the highest score component for one particular service, but one team that has the second-highest score component for all services maintains a higher overall score. For reasons like these, much consideration should be given to when and how attacks are mounted against which opponents.

Some strategies involve broad defenses meant to work in many environments. Unsurprisingly, these often resemble real-world defenses used generically. Network firewalls, IDSs, proxies, etc fall in this category. Of course, these defenses to not work in all CTFs. As in an implementation design discussed above, if the CTF does not allow a competitor to place devices between the vulnerable server and the CTF network, then participants simply are not able to deploy an in-line network firewalls or IDS.

Since service availability is often determined by the organizer polling each service, participants can observe the polling and attempt to deceive the availability measurement. For example, rewriting a service from one programming language to another that has inherent security benefits. From a network perspective, the newly written service can listen on the same TCP port, and indeed mimic the behavior of the original service - only without a software vulnerability introduced by the former language. Depending on CTF organizer choices, such "service replacement" might be encouraged or discouraged. If the polls do not emphasize most of the service functionality, then the replacement might only have to implement a subset of the original features in order to gain all the SLA points from polling.

Progressing with the same idea of service replacemet is replacement of the entire defended host. Especially when the participant's defended host is already a Virtual Machine, creating a second, faux, target might yield considerable defensive points. Other participants might actively attack and steal keys on the secondary host. Since, the organizer is not rotating keys on this second host, keys presented for credit will never be valid. If this is technically permitted, this is prime example of a strategy designed for a participant to benefit by undermining the CTF infrastructure. That is, as opposed to binary patching, service replacement, or other defenses, this strategy is chiefly only useful for the specific CTF. Other methods of undermining infrastructure vary by CTF implementation but might include the ability to present keys rotated to a participant's own server for credit (scoring against self) or the ability to circumvent security controls on CTF infrastructure systems.

Since much of the scoring occurs out-of-band in both styles of events, the point in time that a challenge is completed or service is exploited is decoupled from the point in time that the flag is submitted for credit. This leads to game play strategy where flags are not immediately submitted causing a temporary artificially low score to appear for one's own team, giving the impression of weakness. There is obvious risk with such a strategy as other teams may reach a higher score first. In an extreme case, a team can hoard keys turning them all in at the very end of the event. Some organizers combat hoarding by having keys expire, that is, a key can only be redeemed for credit for N rounds after it is first made available by the organizers. In some cases organizers are able to observe successful access to flags in real-time eliminating both the need to submit stolen flags out of band and eliminating the ability to hoard stolen flags for later submission.


Already, there are websites and groups of individuals devoted to tracking and reasoning about inter-CTF relationships. Team and individual performance is tracked between events and ranked year-on-year. CTFs are no longer rare occurrences, and in some cases prizes awarded to winners are significant. We have presented an overview of the two most common types of CTFs along with relevant discussion regarding CTF implementation choices, scoring, service level agreement, and strategy. Our hope is that, by describing CTFs in this way, that newcomers are at less of a disadvantage to seasoned participants. Implementation choices for infrastructure and scoring, along with the services or puzzles themselves are all created to support the goals of a particular CTF organizer. Understanding the constraints enforced by the CTF infrastructure, effects of scoring, and ultimately strategies that opponents may employ are all critical components to succeeding in CTF. Above all else, it is critical to understand how to participate in a particular CTF as a whole, as excellence in one particular aspect might prove worthless due to a particular scoring metric.

The overview presented here merely scratches the surface of what has already been done with CTFs. The diversity and flexibility inherent in CTF implementation choices indicates that there are numerous ways to create a CTF. This, bundled with a clearly increasing appetite for CTFs is evidence that CTFs will continues to provide a rich ground for innovation for some time to come.